Disturbing Article on Avalanche Preparedness

[tball]

^ Perhaps if you started a thread that was along the lines of “You should not ski in the backcountry!” to address your concerns then the people that wanted to discuss how to do it safely could without getting sidetracked.

Not sidetracked at all. This thread is about an article documenting how people are NOT being safe in the backcountry.

 

[mdf]

1. understanding that closed inbounds terrain is backcountry terrain.
2. the majority of fatalities are happening in considerable conditions.

On 1: I think there is a big education problem for eastern skiers vacationing in the west. A lot of them just don't get that ropes (and the associated risk) are a much bigger deal there than at home. I don't know how to fix that.
On 2: I suspect the high fraction of incidents during "considerable" may be because that is the most common condition. But that also leads to a familiarity trap, "oh, it is always considerable." How often do people read (and absorb) the definition of considerable?

 

[Slim]

@tball , this article is about the fact that, especially in easily accessed backcountry terrain, many people lack the knowledge to make informed decisions. The so called ‘unknown unknowns’.

This is a very different danger than the accidents that happen to (highly) knowledgeable backcountry users.
In other words, they are two separate issues, that need to be discussed induvidualy, because they have completely different causes and solutions.

An analogy might be how here in Duluth, we get people, especially visitors, who are unaware of ripcurrents in Lake Superior when they go to the beach. This puts them at high risk, mostly because they lack any awareness of the risks they are taking.
At the same time, expert surfers and kayakers, fully aware of the risks, also meet with accidents on lake Superior, but the causes and solutions are completely different.

Your desire for ‘bringing these easily accessed area’s inbounds’ cetainly speaks to this issue.
Aside from the desirability, that is impossible from a practical standpoint. After all, Berthoud pass was run as a ski area, and didn’t succeed. Teton Pass? Create a resort there that covers all slopes on both sides? Etc, etc.

 

[James]

The Loveland Pass 2013 Sheeps Creek avalanche deaths were to experienced people, not oblivious yahoos. They knew the conditions too. It's important to look at it for the heuristics of the group and how that affects everyone, including highly experienced people. Had they made their cut across 50yds further down, They'd all likely be alive. Crossing a path one by one becomes an issue if it takes 10min for each person. That's an hour twenty for eight people. That puts pressure to not.

Lou Dawson was also critical of their starting path. It crossed a slide path with a death in 1948. Just some dozen yards in from the road.

Colorado's Loveland Pass Avalanche: Lessons Learned
Colin Bane April 2013
-------------------------
"They were all experienced people, and they let their guard down," says Kurt Olesek, co-founder of the Colorado Snowboard Archive collection at the Colorado Ski & Snowboard Museum in Vail.

Olesek, still spooked from the death of his good friend Mark McCarron a few days earlier in a slide in Vail Pass’s aptly-named Avalanche Bowl, opted to head out in the opposite direction with a different group for a south-facing slope on the other side of Loveland Valley. "I think there was just too much enthusiasm. They were gonna do a quick lap, thinking, ‘It's not far; it's not steep.’ They shouldn't have crossed that slope to begin with. Rick should have known that better than anyone there, but Joe's no dummy, Ian's no dummy. It's easy to get excited: 'I'm gonna do a great run—I'm safe since I'm with my bros.' Then you don't follow protocol. That's when shit goes down."

Olesek says Rick Gaukel's own advice earlier that morning prompted his group's decision to head for a south-facing slope. Gaukel had relayed the CAIC’s forecast to the event attendees, warning of the same "deep persistent slab problem" that had killed McCarron on Thursday, April 18. 



"Rick gave us a safety briefing in the morning,” Olesek recalls. “He said, 'The suspect aspects are north-, northeast-, to east-facing slopes. That's what slid up at Vail Pass; that’s what we need to be cautious of. We're here to make smart decisions.’” 



Forty-five minutes into his hike, Olesek could see the debris from the slide across the valley but didn't worry about his crew: He couldn’t believe anyone would head in that direction after the morning's discussion. 

His group finished their hike, then took a quick run down to meet for beers by their cars, where they learned that six men were unaccounted for. 

-------------------------
www.outsideonline.com/1915051/colorados-loveland-pass-avalanche-lessons-learned

 

[Slim]

I would ask that we keep this thread about Kelli Rohrig’s findings in the side country out of a lift accessed gates, and related situations.

I don't have the mental bandwidth to track the discussion if we also start talking about general backountry dangers and errors in decision making. A sperate thread would certainly be interesting, and help me keep things straight!

 

[Yo Momma]

A diff perspective on the same coin is how hormones like Testosterone + Adrenaline affect our ability to manage the decision process in an emergency. Also prior to an emergency, add in Type A personalities and sprinkle in some Peer Pressure. Maybe this has an affect on the overall failure rates mentioned in the article?

Adrenaline is powerful. We were "sidecountry" and I thought I screamed through the entirety of one of the episodes I mentioned earlier, only to be told later I was eerily calm while digging. I was on a ledge trying to back away from a cliff when the episode happened. To this very day, I still do not remember dropping it. It's a total blank in my mind. Looking at it afterwards, I wouldn't have rationally done what I did to get to my buddy. I was the weakest skier in the group and far from a level of being able to drop cliffs. I blanked from the moment on the cliff until I woke up and he was grabbing at me as we were trying to find his head in the bloody snow... I do remember my hands going numb because I hadn't taken off my poles and the straps had tightened around my wrists. It's frustrating as hell but I just don't remember it all...

To this day he and I are Bro's for Life!

 

[tball]

I would ask that we keep this thread about Kelli Rohrig’s findings in the side country out of a lift accessed gates, and related situations.

The Sheep Creek tragedy is very much a related situation. It's adjacent to Loveland Ski Area, easily accessible from the road, and in my opinion, should be incorporated into the ski area and avalanche controlled, as should East Vail Chutes.

Here's a map of the slide path from the CAIC report. The five well-equipped backcountry experts who died were just a few hundred yards from the hairpin turn on the highway where they parked.

This area is an easily accessible deadly powder honey pot, just like East Vail Chutes. Notice it's immediately above the top of Loveland Valley Ski Area, and adding a lift into this bowl would be a logical expansion of the Valley and add some fantastic skiing. I believe that should be done from both public safety and highest and best use perspectives. The backcountry contingent would fight that obvious expansion tooth and nail.

I'd love to see a similar study of avalanche preparedness on Loveland Pass as to the one at the East Vail backcountry. I suspect Loveland Pass is far worse than East Vail backcountry, based on my observations of folks while driving by and always seeing so many without packs.

More on the Sheep Creek avalanche and victims:

 

[James]

Yeah Loveland Pass is total side country. Car accessed. Just no warning gates. If you drive it with an open pickup truck, you'll often be able to pick peiple up and give them a ride back up.

I don't have the mental bandwidth to track the discussion if we also start talking about general backountry dangers and errors in decision making. A sperate thread would certainly be interesting, and help me keep things straight!

Mostly the same issues. Side country's worse possibly on the heuristic front.

@tball , this article is about the fact that, especially in easily accessed backcountry terrain, many people lack the knowledge to make informed decisions. The so called ‘unknown unknowns’.

This is a very different danger than the accidents that happen to (highly) knowledgeable backcountry users.
In other words, they are two separate issues, that need to be discussed induvidualy, because they have completely different causes and solutions.

Sheeps Creek shows that very experienced users are prone to the same mistakes as inexperienced users. Same dangers.
That might stretch the bandwidth.

 

[Nobody]

@Tricia I can't say for US, and as we have no inbound/outbound, can't relate completely, but when just looking this from my Euro side, seeing whole bunch of people skiing off-piste in ski resorts here on deep powder days (even with avi danger up to 4... that doesn't mean I'm not skiing that, but at least I check how conditions are and if they are ok, I ski at 4, if not, then I don't ski even if it's 1) with no equipment, no knowledge and no condition awareness, I would say yes. Most of them think "I'm just 20, 50, 100m on side of piste, I reached top with lift, so there's absolutely nothing to worry about". I would say this can easily related to your "How bad could it be if I can access it from the place where I bought my lift ticket?"
Based on my experience situation is a whole lot better in real backcountry, where you need touring equipment to get to top and not lifts. Still anything but perfect, but way better then around lifts.

Late to the party but...
This.
In 2018 was discussing with my instructor at the freeride guide course and pointing out that, given my home distance from the skiing field (and difference in elevationand travel distance between the first lift and the top most one at my "local" mountain), if on any given day I was even having an "hunch" that on a given day I would, or might, be skiing off piste, I wouldn't leave the house without avy equipment, even if I was going to ski offpiste only of exactly the distances above from a groomed run. He was agreeing with me, because according to some stats he saw, the majority of avalanche accidents were occurring near the groomed runs within that range, e.g. people were feeling safer (without reason, off piste there is as offpiste as it gets) to ski offpiste there because in sight of a known (familiar) environment, and for that reason prone to ignore any other consideration or failing to be prepared.
I must admit of being guilty as charged myself...I remember a say "one begins life with a bag full of luck and one empty of experience. The trick is to fill the "experience" one before the "luck one" empties"...

 

[locknload]

Seeing this consistently in UT as well. The area just outside the 9990 gate at the Canyons called Dutches Draw slides on a fairly frequent basis and has killed a few over the years who think it's mellow "sidecountry"...its not...its unpatrolled backcountry. You gotta educate yourself, know how to use your gear and study this stuff if you want to be safe and...even then.....despite the best terrain management and decision making...stuff happens out there that you can't predict. I think its great that we have so much better access to the backcountry but human nature gets us into trouble so often.

 

[Tricia]

"one begins life with a bag full of luck and one empty of experience. The trick is to fill the "experience" one before the "luck one" empties"...

That's brilliant.

 

[Nobody]

That's brilliant.

Thanks, it's a pilots' saying (aircraft pilots, that is), AFAIK.

 

[Cheizz]

Having learned how to interpret an avalanche bulletin (very important) is useless if you are not able to identify slope steepness or orientation on a map or on site. And knowing only that is useless if you don't know what that implies in certain circumstances. So, it's the entire package of risk awareness, avalanche info, slope assessment, actual risk management/avoidence and route selection.... And then there is the knowledge and skill needed to pull off a successful buddy rescue when thing do go wrong... That's a lot of knowledge, skill, experience and trust.

 

[SSSdave]

Just read this thread since will be doing some mostly solo bc this spring if shelter in place eases up. Although have the avy gear, would need to study my beacon use again to use it as has been too many years. And will probably not bother carrying any of the avy stuff this spring because I prefer lower gradient slopes well below avalanche gradients. Most bc users seem to be drawn to steep slopes by herd behavior as isn't everyone going there? Like those slopes must be the only places worthwhile after making all the effort? Mostly small mind herd behaviors just like in the summer concentrating on thru trails.

There are still dangers out in low gradient terrain like stream courses and shallow brush zones where one might punch through but such can be seen if one properly prepares by looking at topos and satellite images to clearly understand safe routes and hazards.

Unfortunately I know from experience as a hard core backpacker in summer that a majority of visitors have pathetic map skills including plenty of experienced enthusiasts that otherwise guide themselves by sight.

 

[James]

Interesting general article or podcast on avalanches. Nothing most don’t know but worth listening to.

Snow Science Against the Avalanche
By James Somers
March 16, 2020 The New Yorker
——————-
A standard measure for danger on roads, the Avalanche Hazard Index, computes risk according to the size and frequency of avalanches and the number of vehicles that are exposed to them. An A.H.I. of 10 is considered moderate; at 40, the road requires the attention of a full-time avalanche forecaster. State Highway 210, which runs down the mountain to Salt Lake City, if left unprotected, would have an A.H.I. of 1,045.
——————————

Snow Science Against the Avalanche

On slopes shallow enough to accumulate snow but steep enough for it to be unstable, chaos hides beneath the surface.

www.newyorker.com